A Cross-Cultural Examination of Lexical Studies of Self-Conscious Emotions

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Researchers have long disagreed about the extent to which aspects of human emotions, including cognitive, linguistic, and cultural representations of the emotion domain, are cross-culturally universal, perhaps for biological reasons, or culturally variable and socially constructed. Studies of emotional phenomena, including facial expressions of emotion, dimensions underlying emotion categories, and the representation of emotions in language, have generally supported the claim that there is a core set of emotions that are expressed and recognized in all cultures (see Shaver, Murdaya, & Fraley, 2001, for a brief overview). But there have also been many challenges to this view. Several philosophers and anthropologists have maintained that some cultures have no name for, and thus no conception of, particular emotions recognized in other cultures (e.g., Lutz & White, 1986), that different cultures place different emphases on particular emotions (e.g., Levy, 1984), and that different cultures have devised new emotions and non-Western conceptions of emotion (e.g., Lutz, 1988).

In recent years, the rigid distinction between “universalism” and “relativism” has been breaking down. Wierzbicka (1999), who conducts detailed qualitative studies of emotions named in different languages, for example, has presented cross-linguistic evidence for both universality and cultural specificity. Ekman (1992) has labeled his own approach “neurocultural” to indicate that although there is a hard-wired neural substrate for some emotions and emotional expressions, these emotions and expressions are contextualized within cultures and regulated by cultural “display rules.” Shaver and colleagues (2001; see also Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2006; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987; Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992) have found both substantial cross-cultural similarities and noteworthy cross-cultural differences in the linguistic categorization of emotions, suggesting an underlying commonality augmented and shaped by
local cultural emphases. These authors have argued that emotion researchers should conduct more studies in different cultures, based on languages with different historical roots, so that the issue of universality versus difference, at least with respect to cognitive and linguistic representations of the emotion domain, can be evaluated in light of a more extensive database.

In the present chapter we examine the relatively small literature on lexical approaches to four self-conscious emotions: shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride. We are particularly interested in discovering whether these emotions have been included in major lexical studies and, if so, where these emotions are located in multidimensional or hierarchical representations of the emotion domain. We begin by describing the goals of the lexical approach to emotions and emotion concepts, placing special emphasis on the prototype approach we have adopted when studying emotion concepts. We then turn to the empirical evidence, such as it is, concerning lexical and prototype approaches to shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride. In the final section of the chapter, we offer tentative conclusions about the self-conscious emotions gleaned from existing lexical studies and suggest possible avenues for further research.

*Emotions and Their Cognitive Representation*

It has been notoriously difficult for researchers and theorists to agree on a definition of emotion. This difficulty exists despite the ability of ordinary people in every culture with which we personally have come in contact to talk about the mental and behavioral states that psychologists have studied under the name “emotion” – for example, love, joy, anger, fear, and sadness, as well as more specifically designated states such as disappointment, hatred, and pride. In many languages there is a single name for this category of psychological states. In other languages there are (to our way of thinking) more metaphorical names for the category, such as
“feelings of the heart” (e.g., perasaan hati in Indonesian; Shaver et al., 2001). (Of course, the word “emotion,” in its Latin roots, means to “be moved,” which is also metaphorical.)

One way to get around initial linguistic barriers between cultures is to show people pictures of facial expressions of possible emotions or provide examples of situations that typically evoke emotional reactions, such as being badly cheated, having one’s most important goal achieved or impeded, or watching one’s child die of illness. Usually, these states can be encompassed by a single term or two that can easily be agreed upon by multiple speakers of a particular language. Once the category name itself has been established, people are typically given a list of potential emotional states and asked to rate the extent to which they consider each to be an emotion. This is what Shaver and colleagues have done in numerous studies. Responses to such questions provide an index of the emotion-prototypicality of a given mental state name (i.e., the degree to which the state exemplifies “emotion”). In other studies, measures of emotion-prototypicality have been obtained by asking participants to list (by name) states they consider to be emotions (e.g., van Goozen & Frijda, 1993) and by recording the time it takes participants to determine whether or not a particular word names an emotion (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 2004).

Many people reading the literature on emotion names or cognitive representations of emotions think the authors are talking about “words” rather than emotions (e.g., Sabini & Silver, 2005), but no one who listens to a baseball game on the radio or attends a university lecture about modern cosmology thinks he or she is hearing only about words used to describe baseball games or the universe. Most people think they are hearing about an actual event that unfolds in reality pretty much as described (in the case of the baseball game) or an actual universe filled with galaxies and gravitational forces that developed over time (in the case of the cosmology lecture). Of these two ways of thinking about people’s everyday discourse about emotions (i.e.,
as a discourse about words or as a rough characterization of the actual emotion domain), we prefer the latter.

*The Prototype Approach to Emotion Concepts as an Example*

We are most familiar with the methods used by Shaver and colleagues (based on pioneering work by Fehr & Russell, 1984) in studies conducted in the US, China, Indonesia, Italy, and Spain to examine the lexical representation of emotions. The theory behind those methods, called the prototype approach to categorization, was first proposed by Rosch (1978; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976) in her writings about “fuzzy categories” in everyday language and cognition—categories for which there are no clear “classical” definitions based on necessary and sufficient features. Despite their inherent fuzziness, such categories can be roughly defined in terms of prototypes and central features, and arranged hierarchically according to conceptual levels, which Rosch (1978) called the superordinate, basic, and subordinate levels. This approach to categorization has continued to prove useful in studies of perceptual and linguistic development, memory, and social categorization.

An example of a fuzzy superordinate category is *animal*, which includes diverse category members and is difficult to define using necessary and sufficient features. Within that category are diverse creatures, such as dogs, birds, and snakes, which share few identical physical features but are all members of the animal kingdom. Within the fuzzy basic-level category “birds,” for example, there are subordinate-level categories—parrots, canaries, penguins, and so on—which differ as well but can be summarized in terms of a list of largely shared, though not universally shared, prototypical features (e.g., having feathers, flying, living in trees or other high places, and laying eggs in nests).
When Rosch’s (1978) approach is applied to the domain of emotions, with emotions conceptualized as psychological or behavioral “objects” or “events” – i.e., subjectively experienced and objectively observable events that unfold in regular, script-like (though variable and context-sensitive) ways within particular episodes – it is possible to conceptualize their mental representations as event prototypes or scripts. (The nature of the scripts themselves was explored by Shaver et al., 1987). Like other fuzzy categories, emotion categories can be arrayed hierarchically, in terms of superordinate, basic, and subordinate levels.

A formal picture of the underlying category system can be obtained by applying hierarchical cluster analysis to people’s judgments about similarities and differences between differently named emotional states (e.g., anger, sadness, and embarrassment). When this technique has been used in our studies, a fairly simple picture has arisen in each of the languages studied: At the top of the category hierarchy one finds a major split between what many psychologists call “hedonically positive” and “hedonically negative” emotions, indicating that this common distinction in academic psychology, like the common distinction between emotions and other psychological states, is a carryover from ordinary, everyday knowledge.

Moreover, there is usually a handful of what can be considered “basic level” categories below the superordinate level, and these categories typically include love, happiness, anger, sadness, and fear. In particular cultures and languages, there are sometimes additional basic level categories, including shame (e.g., in Chinese; Shaver et al., 1992). A separate surprise cluster also emerges in Basque, Italian, and English; however, this cluster is considerably smaller and less differentiated than the other basic-level clusters, making its status as a basic-level category questionable. For present purposes, it makes no difference whether surprise is or is not
considered to be a cognitively basic emotion, because most of our attention will be focused on shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride.

Theoretically, concepts at each level should function psychologically like the corresponding concepts in the domains of buildings, furniture, dramas, sports, and animals. People should tend to make preliminary ‘cuts’ of the emotion domain at the basic level, they should be faster when categorizing basic-level emotions, and children should learn basic-level emotion concepts first during language acquisition. The existing empirical evidence supports these hypotheses (Bretherton & Beeghley, 1982; Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler, & Ridgeway, 1986; Shaver et al., 1992; Zammuner, 1998). To the extent that different languages and cultures create different emotion category systems, people who live in different cultures and speak the associated languages should make different intuitive judgments about emotions in social situations, which might sometimes lead to different understandings, behaviors, and social outcomes.

Indices of emotion-prototypicality are generally consistent with hierarchical cluster analyses: Basic-level emotions tend to be rated as most emotion-prototypical; they are most likely to be nominated as emotions in free-listing tasks and are judged most quickly to be emotions. Below this level, and within each of the basic-level categories, there are many more explicitly named emotions (the number depending on the language and the associated culture), such as tenderness, relief, hatred, disappointment, and anxiety.

It is noteworthy that the five largest basic-level emotion categories identified in lexical studies overlap considerably with the emotions proposed by emotion researchers to be “basic” in a biological sense (e.g., Ekman, 1992, Izard, 1991). Although there is some variation across theorists, the list of biologically basic emotions typically includes joy, anger, fear, and sadness,
as well as surprise, disgust, and possibly contempt. Interestingly, love is not generally considered a basic emotion (see Shaver, Morgan, & Wu, 1996), perhaps because it lacks a unique facial signal (but see Gonzaga, Keltner, Londahl, & Smith, 2001, for preliminary evidence regarding such signals). On the other hand, in lexical studies, disgust, surprise, and contempt seem less “basic” than love; they typically receive lower ratings of emotion-prototypicality, are more slowly recognized as emotions, and are less likely to be nominated as emotions in free-listing tasks. With the possible exception of surprise, these emotions tend to appear as subordinate categories in the hierarchical lexical structure.

For purpose of the present chapter, which is descriptive, exploratory, tentative, and eclectic, we need not adopt any particular stance toward the meaning of the empirical results obtained with different abstract analytic procedures. We want mainly to understand where self-conscious emotions are situated in structural representations of the emotion domain, or the domain of emotion names and concepts, whichever domain one believes the results represent. Although the self-conscious emotions are less commonly included in taxonomies of basic emotions, they are sometimes considered “potential” candidates for basic status (e.g., Ekman, 1992, Izard, 1991; Kemeny, Gruenewald, & Dickerson, 2004). In the following sections, we discuss the status of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride in the hierarchical structure of emotion terms across languages and the extent to which these emotions are considered emotion-prototypical.

**Shame**

*Hierarchical Organization*

Across languages, shame-related words are consistently found within the superordinate negative-emotion cluster, often side by side with guilt (e.g., Brandt & Boucher, 1986; Church,
Katigbak, Reyes, & Jensen, 1998). In Italian, for instance, shame and guilt appear together within the sadness cluster (along with remorse; Shaver et al., 1992), and these terms join the sadness cluster high in the hierarchy, suggesting the potential for a separate basic-level category if additional shame-related terms had been included in the analysis. In English, shame and guilt are also clustered closely together within the sadness category (along with remorse and regret; Shaver et al., 1987). However, there is no indication that either term would ever form a basic-level cluster in English. (Examining an English-language thesaurus confirms that there are very few words with similar but slightly different meanings compared with shame, unlike the case for words like love, happiness, and anger.)

Although Shaver et al. (2001) similarly located shame within the sadness cluster in Indonesian (along with hurt), Fontaine et al. (2002), using similarity ratings rather than a sorting procedure, found that shame fell into a larger fear cluster in both Indonesian (along with embarrassment, but not guilt) and Dutch (along with guilt). Shame also appears within the fear cluster in Basque (Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2006) and, along with guilt/discomfort, in Ifaluk (Lutz, 1982).

In fact, Wierzbicka (1986) claimed that, in some languages (e.g., Gidjingali, spoken in Aboriginal Australia), shame is not distinguished lexically from fear. The closest translation of shame, *kunta*, is associated with a desire to retreat or run away, as distinct from the desire to hide or disappear that is typically associated with shame in the North American psychological literature on emotion. In a similar vein, in some languages the equivalent of shame is an emotion that occurs *before* one commits an immoral act, in the way that fear occurs prior to a potentially threatening event, rather than as a response to committing an immoral or socially inappropriate act (e.g., Bilimoria, 1995; Wierzbicka, 1986). Indian philosophy, for instance, describes a shame-
like emotion, hrī, as the fear of social disapproval experienced before committing a misdeed, which may prevent the immoral behavior (Bilimoria, 1995).

Interestingly, in both Chinese (Shaver et al., 1992) and Japanese (Brandt & Boucher, 1986; Kobayashi, Schallert, & Ogren, 2003), shame-related emotions form a separate basic-level cluster (which includes guilt) within the superordinate negative-emotion category. Shame-related terms also appear within other basic-level clusters in Chinese (e.g., rage from shame and shame/resentment in the anger cluster). In a more extensive analysis of 113 Chinese shame-related concepts (Li, Wang, & Fischer, 2004), at least two distinct sub-clusters were identified: “shame self-focus,” which included guilt, and “reactions to shame, other-focus,” which included embarrassment. The abundance and elaboration of shame terms in Chinese suggests that shame is discussed more frequently and in more detail (i.e., is “hypercognized”; Levy, 1973) in China than in other places. Consistent with this idea, Shaver et al. (1992) found that shame was among the first words learned by Chinese children: By two years of age, approximately 70 percent of Chinese children (according to parental report) knew the Chinese word for shame, whereas even by age three, only 10 percent of American children were thought by their parents to know the English equivalent (Ridgeway, Waters, & Kuczaj, 1985).

The differential placement of shame and guilt in different lexical studies – sometimes within a large “sadness” category, sometimes within a large “fear/anxiety” category, and sometimes within its own basic-level category – demonstrates the subtleties inherent in everyday conceptions of emotion. It also shows why it will always be difficult to pin emotion concepts down to certain words or to substitute a technical vocabulary in the psychology of emotions for the everyday language of emotion. In cultures or situations where shame is associated with anxiety or ambivalence about committing a particular action or transgression, it is similar to
other forms of anxiety, apprehension, and fear. But in cultures or situations where shame is conceptualized as an emotion that arises when a person has done something inappropriate, despicable, or regrettable, the emotion is viewed, appropriately, as akin to regret, remorse, and – more broadly – sadness. This suggests that the emotion itself partakes of, or blends with, other emotions, depending on the situation (either an actual situation or a culturally prototypical situation).

It is common on the listserv for the International Society for Research on Emotion for researchers to advocate moving away from everyday language and creating a technical language so that emotions such as shame, self-esteem, and love can be operationalized more precisely. This is similar to Cattell’s (1957) early efforts to give names like sizothymia/affectothymia, threctia/parmia, harria/premsia, and praxernia/autia to basic personality traits, and Ainsworth’s (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) efforts to call the three major attachment patterns in infancy A, B, and C, rather than give them more natural English-language names. Present-day theorists and researchers retain these authors’ ideas but now use terms like warmth, dominance, and openness for some of Cattell’s personality trait dimensions and avoidant, secure, and anxious for Ainsworth’s infant attachment categories. The same thing is likely to occur in studies of emotion, because so much of our knowledge of emotion is wrapped up with the nuances of everyday experience, language, and social interaction that we would quickly lose our intellectual bearings if we attempted to abandon what we already know, albeit somewhat intuitively and implicitly, in favor of a technical language whose connections to reality are unclear to everyone expect the language’s inventor.

*Forms of Cognitive and Linguistic Elaboration in the Emotion Domain*
Shaver et al. (1987) noted, when discussing the relatively small number of cognitively “basic” emotion categories within the large English emotion lexicon, that there seem to be two main reasons for lexical elaboration. One is to mark degrees of intensity. For example, in English one can be slightly embarrassed, embarrassed, or mortified; one can be annoyed, angry, or enraged; one can be apprehensive, frightened, or terrified. The other reason for creating new emotion words is to indicate something special or specific about the situation in which the emotion arises. For example, in English one could be disappointed, which implies that one is sad or unhappy about having expected more than reality delivered; one could be homesick, which implies that one is sad because of being away from home; and so on. The fact that Li et al. (2004) could find 113 shame-related words in Chinese is an indication that there are many designated levels of shame in China, and many specific kinds of situations in which shame arises.

This expectation is confirmed when we see the following attempts to translate some of the Chinese shame terms into English: “losing face,” “truly losing face,” and “losing face terribly.” There is “being ashamed,” but also “being ashamed to death.” As if that were not sufficient, one can be “so ashamed that the even the ancestors of eight generations can feel it.” Beyond these remarkably specific designations of degrees of shame, there are many situation-specific shame words, which (when translated into English by Li et al., 2004) mean: “hushing up a scandal (to avoid shame),” “family shame should not be made public,” and “hiding one’s illness from doctors (trying to hide shameful things).” There are specific words for being “afraid of being gossiped about” and “looking for a hole to climb into.” There are also many fascinatingly graphic words for being shameless: “thick-skinned face without shame,” “one’s facial skin is even thicker than the corner of the city wall (absolutely no sense of shame).”
In contrast, English and Indonesian appear to have very few salient shame-related words. In Indonesian, among the 124 emotion-prototypical words examined by Shaver et al. (2001), only *malu* (shame, disgrace, mortification) qualified. Yet, anthropological observations suggest that shame plays an important role in Indonesian social life, particularly in comparison with Western culture (Fessler, 1999, 2004). Consistent with such observations, Fessler (2004) found that the term *malu*, which was included in Shaver et al.’s (2001) study, is used considerably more often in Indonesia than the word “shame” is used in southern California, and the situations associated with shame in Indonesia were somewhat different and more elaborately linked to other kinds of feelings than those in California. In Indonesian, the concept of shame was centered on inadequacy and social rejection and, consistent with Shaver et al.’s (2001) findings based on cluster analysis, was not closely linked with guilt (see also Brandt & Boucher, 1986). Also consistent with previous findings (Shaver et al., 1987; Brandt & Boucher, 1986), Fessler’s shame cluster in English included only guilt, embarrassment, and humiliation, and was not linked to social rank or shyness. In Indonesia, shame was related to being “reluctant to approach someone of higher status,” “embarrassed by others’ importance,” “feeling inferior,” and feeling “stained” or “dirty.”

Despite these differences, it is easy to imagine American parallels to the situations implied by the Indonesian words in Fessler’s (2004) study. People in North America can certainly be ashamed of their worn or dirty clothes, their less than polished manners, or their “uneducated” language; they can feel awkward and out of place at cocktail parties with famous or high-status individuals. Thus, as with most cross-cultural comparisons we have seen in the emotion literature, there is no indication that people in different cultures, or people speaking different languages, have wildly different experiences or conceptions of emotion (see also Frank,
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It is likely, however, that certain emotions occur more often in one culture than another, are noticed more often and in more detail, matter more, and can be spoken about with greater precision and more easily. We agree with anthropologists and cross-cultural psychologists that these differences are likely to be important and worth understanding much better than we currently do.

Is Shame Ever Positive?

Although there is good evidence for the hypercognition of shame in some cultures (e.g., Chinese culture, as just mentioned), there is little support for the claim made by some emotion theorists that, in some societies, shame is a phenomenologically positive experience, or that shame is associated with positive emotions (e.g., Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995). Scheff (1994) argues that the English language is unique in that there is no distinction between positive and negative aspects of shame: In his view, most languages include a word (roughly translated as humility, e.g., pudor in Spanish) that emphasizes “everyday shame,” which is “always a positive attribute” (p. 40). However, in the languages examined here, shame was consistently located within the superordinate negative-emotion cluster, and even when more extensive analyses of shame-related words were conducted (Fessler, 2004; Li et al., 2004), the semantic domain of shame was always negatively valenced, at least in the minds of people who experienced shame.

This does not mean, however, that shame has no social value and is not looked upon favorably by people who would like to induce it in others. In English we can say, “He’s shameless,” and when we do, it means the person should be ashamed but is either too ignorant or too morally insensitive to realize it. We can say, “Have you no shame?” which means, “Surely you should be ashamed,” and so on. In the study by Li et al. (2004), there are many ways to say
in Chinese, “Even a devil would be scared of one who doesn’t want to maintain his/her face (a shameless person is hopeless).” Li et al. (2004) mention other studies of Asian cultures, which indicate that shame is viewed as a desirable state when it encourages people to behave properly. For example, “In Orissa, India, shame also indicates a heightened awareness and is seen and experienced both as a healthy emotion and an antidote to rage” (Menon & Shweder, 1994).

In fact, Menon and Shweder (1994) reported that Indian participants tended to associate shame with happiness, whereas American participants were more likely to associate shame with anger. These findings could be taken as evidence that shame is positively valenced in India. However, in a replication of Menon and Shweder’s study, Rozin (2003) found that the two cultures differed not in the valence attributed to shame, but in their means of classifying emotions: American participants tended to classify emotions based on valence, whereas Indian participants were more likely to classify them based on their social effects. Because both shame and happiness are perceived to have positive effects on the social order, they were classified together. When asked to make classifications based on valence, both Indian and American participants associated shame with anger. Conversely, when asked to make classifications based on the social effects of the emotion, both groups associated shame with happiness. Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that shame feels bad everywhere in the world when one experiences it oneself, but the capacity to experience shame in culturally appropriate situations is likely to be viewed everywhere as a socially desirable trait.

Measures of Prototypicality

In most samples in which prototypicality ratings have been obtained, shame is perceived as more prototypical of the emotion category than are the other self-conscious emotions (Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2006; Fontaine et al., 2002; Niedenthal et al., 2004; Smith & Smith, 1995;
Zammuner, 1998). In fact, in several languages the prototypicality ratings of shame closely approximated those of the basic-level emotions (e.g., in Basque, Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2006; in Italian, Zammuner, 1998), and in most languages shame prototypicality ratings exceeded those for disgust, surprise, and contempt. There were a few exceptions: In Indonesia, pride received the highest rating, followed by shame (Shaver et al., 2001), and in English there was little difference among the ratings of guilt, shame, and embarrassment, although pride received the lowest emotion-prototypicality ratings of the four emotions (Shaver et al., 1987).

Other indices similarly suggest that shame is considered more emotion-prototypical than the other self-conscious emotions: Compared to guilt and embarrassment, shame was more likely to be nominated in free-listing tasks (Smith & Smith, 1995; van Goozen & Frijda, 1993; Zammuner, 1998; but see Fehr & Russell, 1984) and was recognized more quickly and accurately as an emotion (Niedenthal et al., 2004). In fact, shame was more likely to be nominated than some of the basic emotions (e.g., more so than surprise in Turkish, according to Smith & Smith, 1995; more so than disgust and contempt in Italian, according to Zammuner, 1998). It was recognized more quickly than disgust, contempt, and surprise in French (Niedenthal et al., 2004) and was more likely than disgust and surprise to be classified as an emotion in Filipino (Church et al., 1998).

These findings highlight the importance of shame across languages and the central role of this emotion in human social life. Together with anthropological evidence that a shame-like emotion is present across cultures (Fessler, 1999) and research suggesting that there is a unique behavioral shame display (e.g., Keltner & Buswell, 1996), such findings indicate that shame shares many qualities with the basic-level emotions (Kemeny et al., 2004). It may have been left off the “basic” lists in American psychology partly because it is not as salient as other basic
emotions in North America, and partly because its display is not limited to the face and is easier
to detect when seen developing over time, in a social context. (Love has been neglected for
similar reasons; Gonzaga et al., 2001; Shaver et al., 1996.)

Guilt

In several studies of emotion terms, guilt was not included because it received low
emotion-prototypicality ratings in initial studies (e.g., in Basque, Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2006; in
Indonesian, Shaver et al., 2001; and in Turkish, Smith & Smith, 1995). In cases where it was
included, guilt often clustered with shame and, at times, with embarrassment. In English and
Italian, these three emotions are clustered together within the sadness cluster. In Dutch, guilt and
shame also appear together, but within the fear cluster, and in Chinese, guilt falls within the
basic-level shame cluster. (An equivalent of embarrassment was not included in either the Dutch
or the Chinese studies.)

Thus, at least from a lexical perspective, findings regarding guilt and shame provide little
support for social scientists’ distinctions between these two emotions. Some have proposed that
guilt is more important in individualistic cultures, whereas shame is more important in
collectivistic cultures (e.g., Triandis, 1994). However, as described earlier, shame is generally
perceived as a more prototypical emotion than guilt, with little variation across cultures. Even the
dictionary (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2000) suggests close
connections between shame and guilt, defining shame as “a painful emotion caused by a strong
sense of guilt, embarrassment, unworthiness, or disgrace.” Guilt is defined as a “remorseful
awareness of having done something wrong,” and “self-reproach for supposed inadequacy or
wrongdoing.” This might be a case where science can create more precise and scientifically
useful distinctions than people make in their everyday conversations.
In fact, we believe this is precisely what Tangney (1990; see also Tangney & Dearing, 2002) has done. She retained the ordinary-language terms shame and guilt, but gave each word a technical definition and then operationalized her definitions in a carefully designed questionnaire. Pursuing that strategy, she was able to identify important correlates and consequences of shame and guilt, showing that the two constellations are quite different. In essence, guilt is “good,” is associated with high self-esteem, and can result in improved social behavior; shame is “bad” and is associated with low self-esteem and destructive personal consequences. Perhaps as has occurred with the distinction between “ordinary sadness” and “clinical depression,” science will eventually influence everyday language and cause ordinary people to draw a sharper distinction between guilt and shame.

Embarrassment

Like guilt, embarrassment was not always included in studies of emotion terms because of low initial emotion-prototypicality ratings. When included, embarrassment was often located close to shame, either within the sadness cluster (in English, Shaver et al., 1987; in Italian, Shaver et al., 1992) or the fear cluster (Indonesian, Fontaine et al., 2002). In fact, several languages (e.g., Ifaluk, Lutz, 1982; Oriya of Eastern India, Haidt & Keltner, 1999) appear not to have a distinct term for embarrassment, possibly because of the high degree of semantic overlap between shame and embarrassment. Both intuition and the dictionary suggest that embarrassment is less serious and less deeply painful than shame: “feeling self-conscious or ill at ease, disconcerted.” Most thesauruses list awkwardness, humiliation, mortification, and shame as substitutes for embarrassment, suggesting that intense embarrassment is similar to, or the same as, shame. If so, this may be a case where English has marked degrees of intensity within the shame category rather than naming two completely distinct emotions.
Pride

In most languages, pride falls within the positive emotion superordinate category and the joy/happiness category at the cognitively basic level. It is accompanied in this cluster by triumph in English (Shaver et al., 1987; Storm & Storm, 1987); by amazement, courage, and anticipation in Dutch (Fontaine et al., 2002); by boastful and surprise in Japanese (Brandt & Boucher, 1986); and by tranquil in Sinhalese (Brandt & Boucher, 1986). In Ifaluk, bagbeg, which is translated as pride/love, falls into a cluster that Lutz labels “emotions of good fortune,” which includes happiness and excitement and is indistinguishable from joy/happiness in other studies.

Several of the studies reviewed here included two (or more) words for pride, differing in their evaluative implications. In Indonesian, for instance, besar hati implies pride and elation, whereas tinggi hati is translated as conceit or arrogance. French includes both fierté (pride) and orgueil (arrogant pride; Niedenthal et al., 2004) and in Italian, orogolio and fierezza correspond to justified and arrogant pride, respectively (although only orogolio was included by Zammuner, 1998). As might be expected from this distinction, these two kinds of pride appear in different clusters in the emotion hierarchies. Justified or morally acceptable forms of pride are typically clustered with other positive emotions (e.g., triumph, pleasure). Arrogant pride tends to fall into a large anger cluster, which also includes envy, jealousy, disgust, and contempt (Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2006; Shaver et al., 2001; Shaver et al., 1992). However, in an analysis of English emotion words, Storm and Storm (1987) found that all pride-related words were clustered together within the superordinate positive-emotion category. Within this pride cluster, two distinct subclusters were evident: One included terms such as triumph and victorious and the other included terms such as smug, superior, and arrogant. In this case, the tendency of some research participants to put multiple pride words into the same category, with many of them implying a positive
emotional state, caused all of the pride words to end up on the positive side of the superordinate distinction between positively and negatively valenced emotions. A more extensive analysis of 20 pride-related words similarly revealed two dimensions of pride, one including words such as confident, achieving, and victorious, and another including words such as haughty, arrogant, and pompous (Tracy & Robins, in press).

The Ifaluk language (Lutz, 1982) also appears to contain words for undesirable pride-like emotions — *gatinap* describes someone who is boastful about skills or intelligence, and *gabosbos* refers to a person who shows off material possessions. But these terms, which are typically used to describe someone else’s behavior, not one’s own feelings, were not included in Lutz’s (1982) analysis of emotion words. This situation raises an important issue: We (North Americans and Ifalukians) tend to use different words when describing our own emotions than when describing someone else’s emotions or emotional behavior, especially when we think another person’s emotions or behaviors are reprehensible. If we ourselves accomplish something important, we are likely to view ourselves as justifiably proud; when our children perform well in school or athletics, our parental pride seems natural, very positive, and morally sensible. But when we see someone else “gloating” over a success, especially one we consider minor or undeserved, the words “arrogant,” “smug,” “boastful,” and “self-satisfied” come to mind. This suggests that the term “negative emotion” has two meanings: negative in valence as experienced by oneself and negative in its effects on other people, no matter how good it may feel from the inside.

Tracy and Robins (2004; in press) have argued, however, that both forms of pride, which they refer to as “authentic” and “hubristic” pride, can be used in a self-descriptive manner. Further, according to their model, authentic and hubristic pride are distinguished not only by their effects on others, but also by the extent to which pride-eliciting experiences are attributed to
global, stable characteristics of the self (e.g., intelligence) versus specific, unstable factors (e.g., hard work). In this framework, global, stable attributions for success lead to hubristic pride, whereas specific, unstable attributions lead to authentic pride. In support of these ideas, Tracy and Robins (in press) found that some participants did rate words such as “arrogant” and “conceited” as self-descriptive when recalling past pride-eliciting experiences. People who rated these hubristic words highly were more likely to attribute their success to stable characteristics of the self, and they also scored higher on a measure of narcissism. These findings suggest that hubristic pride may not depend entirely on the evaluations of others. However, the idea that hubristic pride is a negative emotion primarily from an evaluative perspective has two further implications that have not yet, to our knowledge, been addressed. First, hubristic pride should be attributed more often to others than to oneself and, second, it should be a phenomenologically positive emotion for the person who experiences it.

Concluding Comments

We can draw several tentative conclusions from our examination of the sparse literature on shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride in lexical studies of emotion terms. First, these emotions have been relatively neglected in lexical studies. Most lexical studies have been initiated and conducted by North American English speakers, in a part of the world where, until recently, scant attention has been paid to self-conscious emotions in psychology. Moreover, even if researchers had paid attention to words designating these emotions, English seems to be somewhat lacking in single-word names for them. For instance, although many languages make clear distinctions between two forms of pride (i.e., justified pride versus smugness or arrogance), only “pride” in English was considered emotion-prototypical enough to qualify for inclusion in subsequent analyses. (This is may be due in part to the fact that smugness and arrogance are not
“feelings,” but rather are ways of acting.) In addition, in the few lexical studies of English emotion terms, guilt, shame, and embarrassment all cluster closely together, suggesting that typical English speakers, even those attending college, do not draw clear distinctions among these emotions. Moreover, as we mentioned briefly, English dictionaries seem to draw the different emotions together in readers’ minds rather than distinguish among them. This paucity of terms is certainly not a problem in languages like Chinese, but even there, where shame forms a basic-level category, guilt and embarrassment terms reside within the shame cluster, suggesting strong similarity. Thus, if psychologists wish to distinguish among shame, guilt, and embarrassment, as Tangney and her associates have done, they must refine or go beyond the distinctions embedded in everyday language.

Second, shame, guilt, and embarrassment are hedonically negative emotions, at least as experienced by people who are ashamed, guilt-ridden, or embarrassed, even though other people— including guilty, ashamed, and embarrassed people at times when they are not feeling these negative emotions— may view such states as socially desirable and useful. These “self-conscious” emotions play a role in social control and interpersonal relations, and are therefore unlikely to be ignored or eliminated by any society.

In contrast, although pride is a hedonically positive emotion, it may have negative connotations when it is expressed in an excessive, inconsiderate, or arrogant way. Terms related to arrogance were often placed in the anger category along with envy, jealousy, and contempt. Such classifications may reflect participants’ perceptions of the source of arrogance, or simply the co-occurrence of these different emotions. This may also be a case of observers having a negative emotion in response to seeing another person experience what is for him or her a presumably positive emotion. Languages make this distinction in ways that research participants
in lexical studies may not clearly understand. This may be one reason why, at least in English, emotions similar to arrogant pride were not considered prototypical emotions (e.g., vanity, superiority; Shaver et al., 1987), or were not included in initial lists of potential emotion terms. Such terms may also have been excluded because they often refer to trait-like behavior patterns (e.g., conceit, smugness) rather than emotional states.

Third, lexical studies conducted to date suggest that shame is the most distinctive and salient of the self-conscious emotions. It seems to play a larger role in some cultures and languages than either guilt or embarrassment, and at least in Chinese there are many words and ideas associated with it. It would be worthwhile to understand the reasons for shame’s special status. One possibility, which is inherent in Tangney’s work (e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002), is that guilt occurs when a person misbehaves in relation to specific rules, laws, or moral prescriptions. This can obviously be a serious matter for society, but it can often be handled by appropriate punishment or rectified in fairly straightforward ways (apologizing, paying restitution to the injured party, paying a fine to society, or serving a prison sentence). Shame involves a violation of something broader and deeper: society’s definition of what it means to be a worthy, competent, good, and respectable person. Here, the implication seems to be that society can no longer count on a person to meet minimal standards for membership. Because of the strong links between perceived acceptance and social status, on the one hand, and one’s feelings of self-worth, optimism, and self-confidence, on the other, entering a state of shame can do profound damage to a person’s overall sense of well-being, safety, and self-respect. Embarrassment, by comparison, typically deals with much less serious violations of social standards, and can usually be erased by admitting a mistake or faux pas and showing a sincere wish to be admitted immediately back into a local group’s good graces.
If this analysis is on the right track, it suggests that shame needs and deserves more linguistic concepts to cover its various forms and degrees of intensity. In Chinese, the requisite linguistic work appears to have been done, but in English it has not. This has made it necessary for English-speaking theorists like Lewis (1971) and Scheff (1994; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991) to analyze shame in great detail, for both clinical and research purposes. It might be worthwhile for psychologically trained speakers of Chinese to work with North American, English-speaking psychologists to flesh out our technical language for dealing with self-conscious emotions, especially shame. It is possible that this would speed our advancement toward an appropriately complex analytic framework for thinking about and assessing self-conscious emotions. It might also take the individualistic edge off our typical social behavior, making us more comfortable fellow citizens in an increasingly shrinking world.
References


